











































































































































































I encourage potential readers of this paper to ﬁrst put it down for two minutes and thumb
through a thirty- or forty-year-old issue of an economics journal. I anticipate that this will
convey much better than I can how dramatically economics papers have changed over the
last few decades. Papers today are much longer.1 They have longer introductions.2 They
have more sections discussing extensions of the main results. They have more references.3
The process by which papers get published has also changed dramatically. Around 1960
the Quarterly Journal of Economics reserved the “revise-and-resubmit” option for ﬁve or
so special cases per year. In the early 1970’s most journals’ processes still let authors
submit their papers, receive reports, make revisions and get a ﬁnal acceptance within
about nine months. Today extensive revisions are the norm and getting an acceptance
takes 20 to 30 months at most top journals.4 Many other academic disciplines have had
similar experiences. While the changes in academic journals are widespread and dramatic,
they have received little attention. Perhaps this reﬂects that the changes have occurred
gradually and that researchers in each ﬁeld see only a small part of the overall picture.
In this paper I develop a model to organize the observed trends and help us think about
potential explanations. My central premise is that we can usefully regard academic papers
as diﬀering along two quality dimensions: q and r. I think of q as reﬂecting a paper’s main
ideas and r as representing other aspects of quality described by words like craftsmanship,
thoroughness and polish. I think of the various changes noted above as diﬀerent aspects
of a single phenomenon — an increase in the r-quality of published papers. I ﬁrst develop
an equilibrium model of time allocation and quality standards and use it to discuss what
1Ariel Rubinstein’s 1982 Econometrica article, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” for example,
is shorter than the average note in Econometrica in 2000 (if one accounts for the type sizes).
2For example, Amartya Sen’s “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” and two other papers in the
January-February 1970 issue of the Journal of Political Economy had one paragraph introductions. No
introduction in the Feburary 2000 JPE was shorter than seven paragraphs and two were longer than Sen’s
entire paper.
3An extreme example here is Michael Spence’s 1973 QJE paper “Job Market Signaling.” It contains two
references. While my anectodes all relate to classic papers, old journals also contain many derivative papers
making Nth order contributions to long forgotten literatures. These also look very diﬀerent from today’s
papers.
4The one exception is the QJE where it takes about 13 months. See Ellison (2000) for much more data
on the duration of review process.
1might cause such an increase. I then develop a dynamic learning model in which economists
struggle to reconcile the high standards to which they are being held with the mediocrity
they see in journals (This occurs in part because economists have biased views of the quality
of their own work.) The model predicts that social norms will evolve gradually to emphasize
r-quality.
I begin in Section 2 with a quick look at some data on the form of papers and the length
of the review and revision process in a number of disciplines.
Section 3 describes a static equilibrium model of the journal publishing process. A
continuum of economists are endowed with one unit of time in which to write one paper for
the one journal in the profession. Papers are described by their position along two quality
dimensions, q and r. I interpret the q dimension as reﬂecting the clarity and importance
of the main results of the paper, and the r dimension as reﬂecting various other aspects
of quality (generality, robustness checks, extensions, etc.) that are typically improved
in revisions and when authors “polish” papers prior to submission. The main decision
economists make is how to divide their time between the developing new ideas and working
on r-quality. A commonly understood social norm determines how the quality dimensions
are weighted.
I analyze the static model in Section 4. For a range of parameter values the model
produces a reasonable outcome. Papers initially submitted to the journal can be divided
into three groups. Papers with the lowest q are determined to be of suﬃciently low interest
that no feasible revision could make them acceptable. They are not revised. A second set of
papers with intermediate q’s are marginal. These papers are revised to the greatest extent
possible, but only some become acceptable. Finally, papers with a suﬃciently high q will
be publishable even if they achieve a somewhat lower r. The authors of these papers are
always able to meet the revision standard that is set for them.
I make two main observations about the static model. First, a continuum of social norms
are possible. If the community agrees that q-quality is very important, then authors will
spend most of their time developing main ideas. If r-quality is very important, then authors
spend very little time on ideas and focus on revisions. Nothing in the model prevents either
extreme or something in the middle from being an equilibrium. Second, the marginal papers
2that fall just short of being accepted are relatively low in q-quality and relatively high in
r-quality relative to the set of resubmitted papers. This is a consequence of the assumption
that a paper’s q-quality is developed ﬁrst and revisions later increase r.
The model makes clear that a number of equilibrium comparative statics explanations
could be given for increases in r-quality. Such explanations, however, may not work well
in practice. The observed changes in economics and other ﬁelds are large. Accounting for
them requires either a large change in some exogenous variable or a high sensitivity of the
outcome to an exogenous variable. My impression from the empirical work I’ve done is that
the economics profession has not changed much over the last thirty years. (Ellison, 2000)
Equilibrium explanations are also hard to reconcile with editors’ comments that changes
were not planned or desired. I take these diﬃculties as motivation for exploring evolutionary
explanations — to account for observed changes such an explanation only need sto provide
a good reason to think that each year papers will be a paragraph longer and require a
couple weeks more to revise than the year before.
Section 5 describes a dynamic learning model. The main actors in the model are the
journal’s referees (who are also the authors). The referees are not self-interested. They
simply try to apply the prevailing standards of the profession in weighting q-quality and
r-quality and in proposing a set of improvements that would bring a paper up to the pub-
lication threshold. Referees learn the prevailing standards from two sources: observations
of what revisions they are asked to make and observations of whether editors eventually
decide to accept or reject papers they have refereed. Editors are not an active force in the
model. They simply ﬁll the journal’s slots by accepting the fraction τ of papers with the
highest average quality (weighted according to the then prevailing norm). I view this as a
model of a busy editor. Making referees the driving force is also consistent with editors’
comments that they abhor the trend toward ﬁfty page papers with myriad extensions and
wish that authors would just concisely explain what ideas they have.
Section 6 discusses the dynamic model with no overconﬁdence bias. All of the equilibria
of the static model are steady-states. I note that if referees try to to hold authors to a
standard that is infeasibly high, then economists will both realize that overall quality stan-
dards are lower than they had thought and conclude that r-quality must be relatively more
3important than they had thought. The latter inference is made because the submarginal
papers that are unexpectedly accepted are relatively low in q and relatively high in r.
Section 7 adds in the assumption that economists are biased and think their work is
slightly better than it really is.5 The former steady-states of the model are destabilized
as referees try to hold others to the higher standard that they perceive is being applied
to their own papers. Standards can not stray far from the equilibrium set — referees
would see editors accepting many papers they strongly recommended against and this
would overwhelm the  bias. What happens instead is that referees perpetually try to hold
authors to a standard that is slighly too high. The observation of the previous section
about how economists rationalize standards that are too high still applies. The result is a
gradual evolution of social norms to increasingly weight r-quality. The slow steady form of
the dynamics makes them a candidate for explaining observed trends. In the long run the
process stops short of papers having no q-quality at all, because the dynamics change once
no paper’s idea is good enough to make its acceptance a sure thing.
There has been little related theoretical work on the dynamics of standards. The most
notable is Sobel’s (1998) analysis of a model in which a series of candidates work to obtain
admission to a club. (One could think of publishing in a journal as an example.) Judges
have heterogeneous tastes. The focus is on how diﬀerent voting rules lead to rising, falling
or ﬂuctuating standards.
The fact that I have not to followed the current trend and given this paper an overly
general title and a seven page introduction should not be taken to indicate that there are not
broader lessons to be learned from it. There are all kinds of social norms, e.g. standards
for politeness, standards for language and violence on television, hazing at fraternities,
hours worked by young doctors and lawyers, years spent in higher education, distributions
of grades, etc. Many of these norms have commonly perceived trends, but other than the
5In the psychology literature this is referred to as an overconﬁdence bias. An often discussed example is
Svenson’s (1981) ﬁnding that about 90 percent of the U.S. college students in his study estimated themselves
to be safer (and more skillful) at driving than the median subject. Psychologists have reported that experts
in many ﬁelds are overconﬁdent in assessing their own ability to answer questions. Lichtenstein, Fischoﬀ
and Phillips (1982) provide a nice (but early) survey. Overconﬁdence is frequently mentioned in ﬁnance to
motivate the existence of agency problems and to justify the actions of noise traders as in De Long et al
(1990). Odean (1998) is a notable recent contribution with a detailed summary of psychology and ﬁnance
papers on overconﬁdence. Rabin (1998) discusses a number of other psychological biases and their relevance
to economics.
4literature on fashion cycles, e.g. Karni and Schmeidler (1990) and Pesendorfer (1995), most
of the existing literature on social norms doesn’t focus on change. I will not try to draw
conclusions about other norms from my results. My view is that one would need to analyze
each application separately and think about how the norm is learned to assess whether a
drift should be expected and if so in what direction.
On a theoretical level, the paper’s innovation is to note that one can produce a model
that explains a long gradual trend by making a slight perturbation to a model with a
continuum of equilibria. In an early presentation of this paper Robert Barro asked a
penetrating question: ‘so are you trying to tell us that you’re going to explain a thirty-year
trend by saying that we’ve been out of equilibrium the whole time?’ My answer is “Yes!” I
hope to convince readers that models of the type I introduce make such arguments possible.
2 Some data from various disciplines
Table 1 provides some statistical evidence on how the form of an academic article has
changed. The table lists the average page length and the average number of references for
articles in top journals in a number of disciplines. Economics papers are roughly twice as
long as they were twenty ﬁve years ago and have about twice as many references. In almost
all ﬁelds papers seem to be longer now than in 1975. The increases are more moderate in
the sciences. Likewise with the exceptions of law and history, articles now tend to have
more references. While economics has experienced substantial reference growth it has a
long way to go to catch many social sciences.
Table 2 provides some evidence on how long it takes to review papers and on how
extensively they are revised for publication in a number of ﬁelds. In almost every case it
takes longer to get a paper accepted now than it did in 1975. While Econometrica and
the Review of Economic Studies have the most drawn out publication processes among
the listed journals, similar trends are visible in computer science, psychology, statistics,
linguistics and ﬁnance, and I’ve been told that many rounds of revisions are also the norm
at the top journals in marketing, political science, and a number of other social sciences.
A slowdown is also visible in some sciences, but the time scale is completely diﬀerent.
53 The static model
In this section I describe a simple static model of academic publishing. The main actors in
the model are a continuum of economists (of unit mass). Each economist is endowed with
one unit of time and may write one paper. There is one economics journal that publishes a
mass τ of papers with 0 < τ < 1. Economists preferences are lexicographic in publications
and leisure time, i.e. they attempt to maximize the probability of publishing an article in
the journal; holding the probability of publication ﬁxed they prefer more leisure to less.
Papers can be fully described by two dimensions of quality, q and r. The q-quality
dimension is intended to reﬂect the inherent importance, interest, clarity etc. of the main
ideas of the paper. The r-quality dimension is intended to reﬂect additional aspects of
quality that authors improve when they are asked in revisions to improve and tighten a
paper’s exposition, to make clear relationships to other papers in the literature, to generalize
theoretical results, to check the robustness of empirical results, to extend the analysis to
consider related questions, etc.
Social norms for evaluating papers are assumed to be common and commonly known.
Under the (α,z)-social norm, papers are regarded as worth of publication if and only if
αq + (1 − α)r ≥ z. The parameter α may reﬂect two diﬀerent value judgements. In
addition to reﬂecting what people think makes a paper valuable, it can also reﬂect what
people think authors should be required to do. For example, a referee might argue that
while he feels that a particular high q, low r paper is “better” than the marginal paper
in a journal, it should still be rejected because the good idea does not excuse the author’s
failure to make r improvements required of everyone else.
The timeline of the model is illustrated below. While the model is described as a four
step process with three groups of players, at the moment the authors are the only ones
acting in a nonmechanical way.













6In the ﬁrst stage of the model, authors choose the fraction tq ∈ [0,1] of their time to
devote to thinking up and developing the main ideas of the paper. The result is a paper
of q-quality q ∼ F(q|tq). Assume that F is continuously diﬀerentiable in tq and for each
tq F has an everywhere positive density f(q|tq) on the interval [0,m(tq)] (with m(tq) > 0
being possibly inﬁnite). Natural speciﬁcations will have the q distribution increasing in tq.
For example, q might be assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0,tq] or exponentially
distributed with mean tq.
In the second stage of the model authors submit their papers to the journal. The
journal’s referees correctly assess the quality q of the paper and report that it will be
acceptable for publication if and only if authors are able to revise it and achieve an r-
quality of at least r(q) as deﬁned by αq + (1 − α)r(q) = z. In practice one can think of
r(q) as a measure of the number of improvements refereees ask for in their reports and the
diﬃculty of the tasks.
In the third stage authors choose the amount of time tr ∈ [0,1 − tq] to spend on
revisions. The production of r-quality is again a random process. Speciﬁcally, assume that
r = h(tr) + η, where η is a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,σ] with σ > 0.
Assume that the production of revisions is a decreasing returns activity with h(0) = 0,
h0 ≥ 0 and h00 < 0. To ensure that time will be allocated to both dimensions of quality I
assume also that h0(0) = ∞, and h0(1) = 0.
In the fourth stage, editors accept the fraction τ of papers for which αq + (1 − α)r is
highest for publication.
An equilibrium of the model is a quadruple, (α,z,t∗
q,t∗
r(q)) such that t∗
q and t∗
r(q) are
chosen to maximize the probability that αq + (1 − α)r ≥ z (and are as small as possible if
there are multiple choices that yield the same probability of publication) and such that the
fraction of papers with αq + (1 − α)r ≥ z is exactly τ. I will refer to (α,z) as a consistent
social norm if there exist choices of tq and tr(q) for which (α,z,tq,tr(q)) is an equilibrium.
4 Analysis of the static model
In this section I analyze the model described in the previous section. I wish to highlight two
main observations. First, many diﬀerent social norms are possible. Second, the marginal
7accepted papers tend to have relatively low q-quality and relatively high r-quality in the
universe of published papers.
4.1 Characterization of equilibrium
The analysis of the equilibrium is a straightforward backward induction argument. Consider
an equilibrium (α,z,t∗
q,t∗
r(q)). Because of the lexicographic preference for publications over
leisure, at t = 3 authors will devote all of their remaining time to improving their paper’s
r-quality unless the paper is sure to be rejected anyway or is sure to be accepted even if
less time is devoted to revisions. As a result we have,
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium of the model, let q = (z −(1−α)(h(1−t∗
q)+σ))/α and
q = (z − (1 − α)h(1 − t∗






0 if q < q,
1 − t∗
q if q < q ≤ q,
h−1((z − αq)/(1 − α)) if q ≤ q.
(For this proposition, deﬁne h−1(x) ≡ 0 if x < 0.)
Note that q may be less than zero and q may be greater than the upper bound of
the support of q. Hence, it is possible that either of the extreme cases may not arise for
particular parameterizations of the model.
In the ﬁrst stage, the time tq allocated to trying to develop the main ideas for a paper
will be chosen to maximize the probability of eventual publication. Write G(z;t) for the
probability that αq +(1−α)r is at most z when tq = t and tr is chosen optimally as in the
above proposition. Note that this probability is the same as it would be if tr was simply
















Note that G is uniformly continuous in z and t. It is strictly increasing in z whenever
G(z;t) is strictly between zero and one. Write G−1(p;t) for the inverse of this function for
a ﬁxed t. The equilibrium time allocation is easily described by
8Proposition 2 In the ﬁrst stage of any equilibrium, the time allocated to developing q-
quality satisﬁes
t∗
q ∈ ArgmaxtG−1(1 − τ;t).
Proof
In equilibrium, each economist’s paper is accepted with probability τ. Hence, z must
satisfy G(z;t∗
q) = (1 − τ). If t∗
q does not belong to ArgmaxtG−1(1 − τ;t), then any t which
does maximize that expression has G−1(1−τ;t) > G−1(1−τ;t∗
q) = z. Because G is strictly
increasing in z whenever 0 < G(z;t) < 1, this implies that G(z,t) < G(G−1(1 − τ;t)) = τ,




Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of paper qualities in a “typical” equilibrium — in this
case generated by assuming that τ = 0.3, q is uniformly distributed on [0,tq], the technology
for r production is h(tr) =
√
tr −tr/2 with σ = 0.2, and the social norm for judging papers
has α = 0.5 and z ≈ 0.504.
For these parameters, the equilibrium eﬀort allocated to q production turns out to be
t∗
q ≈ 0.826. All three possible outcomes of a submission occur. Authors of papers with
q-quality less that q ≈ 0.48 realize that their papers have no chance of becoming acceptable
and do not attempt to revise them. Authors of papers with q ∈ (q,q) ≈ (0.48,0.68) devote
as much time as possible to revising (setting tr = 1 − t∗
q ≈ 0.174) and have their papers
accepted with probability strictly between zero and one. Authors of papers with quality
q ∈ [q,m(tq) = t∗
q] ≈ [0.68,0.83] do the minimal revision necessary to ensure that their
papers will be accepted with probability one.
The ﬁgure shows the outline of the support of the equilibrium distribution of paper
qualities in (q,r)-space. Paper qualities are distributed with a constant density within
these regions. Papers in the lower left box are those for which authors set tr = 0. These
papers are never accepted. The upper right region is divided into a triangle of papers that
are revised then rejected and a trapezoid of papers that are accepted. The mass of papers


















































Figure 1: The equilibrium distribution of paper qualities in a “typical” equilbrium: τ = 0.3,
q ∼ U[0,tq], h(t) =
√
t − t/2, σ = 0.2, α = 0.5, z ≈ 0.504.
The form of the equilibrium seems to reﬂect fairly well the functioning of an economics
journal. One observation I’d like to make is that the “marginal” rejected papers have
relatively low q-quality compared to the pool of accepted papers — they all have q ∈ [q,q].
The marginal rejected papers are not relatively low in r-quality. Their authors have spent
as much time as possible revising and achieved r-qualities that are on average superior to
those of accepted papers.
While I think that the case illustrated above is the primary one of interest and subse-
quent arguments focus on it, the equilibrium can take other forms for diﬀerent parameter
values. Most notably, when α is suﬃciently small (i.e. q-quality is of little importance)
all authors set tr = t∗
q — there will always be some chance that any idea, no matter how
vacuous, can be developed into a publishable paper and no paper’s idea is good enough to
make its eventual acceptance a sure thing. The following proposition formalizes this obser-
vation. Figure 2 graphs the equilibrium distribution of paper qualities and the acceptance
and rejection regions for such a case: q ∼ U[0,tq], h(tr) =
√
tr −tr/2, σ = 0.2, α = 0.2 and
z ≈ 0.532.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the upper bound of the q-distribution, m(tq), is ﬁnite and
uniformly bounded for all tq ∈ [0,1]. Then, there exists α > 0 such that for all α ∈ (0,α),
t∗
r(q) = 1−t∗
q for all q ∈ [0,m(t∗

















Figure 2: An example of the equilibrium quality distribution in a “low α” equilibrium:
τ = 0.3, q ∼ U[0,tq], h(t) =
√
t − t/2, σ = 0.2, α = 0.2, z ≈ 0.532.
and no paper achieves a level of q-quality suﬃcient to ensure that it will be accepted with
probability one.
Proof
To see that q ≤ 0 note that if a paper with q = 0 is revised to the greatest extent possible
and gets the best possible draw on r-quality its overall quality will be (1−α)h(1−t∗
q)+σ.
In equlibrium,
Prob{αq + (1 − α)r ≥ (1 − α)(h(1 − t∗
q) + σ)} ≤ Prob{r ≥ h(1 − t∗









q)/σ → 0 as α → 0.
For α suﬃciently small the expression is less than τ, and hence there is a positive probability
of the paper with q = 0 being acceptable.
Similarly, to see that q > m(t∗
q) note that if a paper with q-quality m(t∗
q) is revised to
the greatest extent possible but gets the worst possible draw on r-quality its overall quality
level is αm(t∗
q) + (1 − α)h(1 − t∗
q) and
Prob{αq + (1 − α)r ≥ αm(t∗
q) + (1 − α)h(1 − t∗










→ 1 as α → 0.
11Hence, for any τ < 1 the probability that a paper with q-quality m(t∗
q) fails to be among
the best τ is strictly positive if α is suﬃciently small.
QED.
Some of the results I’ll give later will depend on the form of the equilibrium. To simplify
the statements of these results I will give the forms pictured in the ﬁgures (and a couple of
other forms) names.
Deﬁnition 1 I will say that an equilibrium is “typical” or has the typical form if 0 < q <
q < m(t∗
q) and r(m(t∗
q)) > 0. An equilibrium has the “low α” form if q < 0 < m(t∗
q) < q.
It has the “somewhat low α” form if 0 < q < m(t∗
q) < q. It is of the “high α” form if
0 < q < q < m(t∗
q) and r(m(t∗
q)) < 0.
The somewhat low α form is similar to the low α form, with the only diﬀerence being
that in the former authors of the lowest q papers do not revise their papers. The high α form
is similar to the typical form, but the highest q papers are so good that r(q) is negative, i.e.
referees tell the authors that even if they revised the paper to make it worse it would still
be publishable. The authors of these papers obviously exert no eﬀort on revisions and have
their papers accepted with quality to spare. In the model with q ∼ U[0,tq], h(t) =
√
t−t/2,
σ = 0.2 and τ = 0.3 the equilibrium has the low α form for α ∈ (0,0.2285), the somewhat
low α form for α ∈ (0.2286,0.3363), the typical form for α ∈ (0.3364,0.5869) and the
high α form for α ∈ (0.5870,1). In other speciﬁcations for the model the equilibrium can
take on other forms. For example, if the distribution of q is unbounded (or τ is large) we
will simultaneously see papers of the lowest q-quality being resubmitted and papers of the
highest q-quality being accepted with no revisions.
4.3 The multiplicity of consistent social norms
In the model described above not all social norms are consistent. If there is only room
in the journal for a small fraction of papers, then the quality threshold z must be high.
This, however, is really the only constraint. Nothing in the model restricts the weight the
community places on q-quality versus r-quality. There are a continuum of consistent social
norms with any α being possible. The following proposition gives a formal statement to this
12eﬀect, and Figure 3 graphs the set of consistent social norms for the model with q ∼ U[0,tq],
h(t) =
√
t − t/2, σ = 0.2 and τ = 0.3.
Proposition 4 In the model described above, for any α ∈ [0,1] there exists an unique z∗(α)
such that (α,z∗(α)) is a consistent social norm.
Proof
For any ﬁxed α, let G(z;t) be the CDF of αq+(1−α)r as above. Let H(z) = inft G(z;t).
Because G is uniformly continuous, t is chosen from a compact set and limz→∞ G(z;t) = 1
for all t, H is continuous with H(0) = 0 and limz→∞ H(z) = 1. Hence there is a solution
z∗(α) to H(z) = 1 − τ. (α,z∗(α)) is a consistent social norm.
It is not possible for both (α,z) and (α,z0) to be consistent social norms with z < z0.
In that case, an agent setting tq equal to the the equilibrium choice under the (α,z0) norm













Figure 3: Consistent social norms (α,z) in the model with q ∼ U[0,tq], h(t) =
√
t − t/2,
τ = 0.3, and σ = 0.2.
4.4 Explanations for observed increases in r-quality
My view of the trends in economics papers mentioned in the introduction is that they can
all be thought of as aspects of an increase in the r-quality of published papers. The model
makes clear that a number of diﬀerent explanations for such a change are possible.
13The explanation I focus on in the latter half of this paper is that the r-quality of
published papers will increase if α decreases, i.e. if social norms shift to place relatively less
emphasis on q-quality and relatively more emphasis on r-quality. This raises the r-quality
of published papers for two reasons: economists react by allocating more of their time to
producing r-quality; and when choosing from the pool of resubmitted papers the journal
places more emphasis on r-quality.
Other plausible explanations do not require a change in social norms for trading oﬀ q
and r. One is that the technologies for producing q and r may have shifted over time. For
example, one could argue that economists have begun to exhaust the set of all possible ideas
and model this as a change in F(q|tq) that reduces the marginal beneﬁt of tq. Similarly,
one could argue that advances in computer technology or accumulated knowledge allow
authors to produce more r-quality per unit time. A second potential explanation is that
publishing in the top journals may have become more competitive. We might think of the
growth of the profession and other factors as equivalent to a decrease in τ, and this might
raise quality standards in both dimensions.6
The latter explanation is not straightforward, so I’ll discuss it further. Intuitively,
reducing τ has two eﬀects. First, it allows the journal to be more selective when choosing
from the pool of resubmitted papers. Second, it aﬀects authors’ time allocation decisions.
If authors react to increased competition by gambling on bold projects that require a lot
of tq, the second eﬀect could oﬀset the ﬁrst and make the overall eﬀect of competition on
r-quality ambiguous.
Formally, I should note ﬁrst that nothing in the assumptions so far guarantees that
G−1(1−τ;tq) (which plays the role of the economists’ objective function when tq is selected)
is quasiconcave. If, for example, q ∼ U[0,ktn
q] with n > 1, then the production of q-quality
would involve increasing returns. In some cases, both both 0 and some higher value of tq will
be local optima and t∗
q will change discontinuously in the parameters. To provide as simple
a discussion as I can of the potential eﬀects of τ on r-quality, I will avoid such complications
by just assuming that F(q;t) is such that t∗
q is the unique solution to ∂G
∂t (z∗(α,τ);t) = 0
6Ellison (2000) notes that by many measures the growth in the profession over the last 30 years has been
moderate, but that decreases in the number of articles published by some top journals and an increase in the
relative status of the top journals may have also contributed to a more substantial increase in competition.
14among values of t for which G(z∗(α,τ);t) < 1 and that the probably of achieving the























z∗ is always decreasing in τ and we have assumed that ∂2G
∂t2 is positive. Hence, t∗
q will be
decreasing in τ if ∂2G
∂z∂t(z∗(τ);t∗
q(τ)) < 0. To think about the sign of this derviative note
that ∂G
∂z (z;tq) is the density of the overall quality distribution. If the q distribution becomes
more spread out when authors spend more time thinking of new ideas and the production
of r-quality is a more deterministic process in which increases in tr only shift the mean
r-quality (as we’ve assumed), then the natural outcome is for the density to be decreasing
in tq, in which case the ∂
∂t
∂G
∂z is negative. In this case, t∗
q will increase as τ decreases, and
the overall eﬀect of τ on r-quality may be ambiguous.
For a more direct intuition note that t∗
q reﬂects authors setting α times the eﬀect of tq on
q-quality equal to (1−α) times the eﬀect of tr on r-quality conditional on their luck being
such that their paper is marginal for the journal. When the journal is highly nonselective,
this is conditioning on getting a very bad draw from the q distribution. When the journal
is extremely selective, the conditioning is on getting nearly as a good a draw as possible on
q. With a functional form like F(q|tq) ∼ U[0,tq], the higher percentiles of the q distribution
are more sensitive to tq investements. Hence the return to tq is greater when one conditions
on the paper being marginal for a more selective journal.
Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀects of changes in τ on time allocation and quality in a model
with q ∼ U[0,tq], h(t) =
√
t − t/2, σ = 0.2, and α = 0.5 The left panel shows that t∗
q is
monotonically decreasing, i.e. t∗
q increases as the journal becomes more competitive.7 The
right panel shows the eﬀect of τ on the mean q- and r-quality of the published papers. The
7The shape of the ﬁgure when τ is near zero is sensitive to the distributional assumptions. With the
uniform speciﬁcation the maximum possible return to tq is bounded and t
∗
q is bounded away from one as τ
approaches zero. If q had been speciﬁed as exponentially distributed with parameter tq, the eﬀect of tq on
the 1 − τ
th percentile of the q distribution would grow without bound as τ approaches zero and the time
spent on revisions would decrease all the way to zero in the limit.
15relationship beween τ and r-quality is nonmonotonic. At some points the eﬀect of τ on t∗
q




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Eﬀect of journal selectivity on time allocation and observed paper quality
5 A dynamic model of evolving norms
The static model above has a continuum of equilibria corresponding to diﬀerent social
norms. In this section I describe a dynamic model of the evolution of norms. The model
involves a population of author-referees who are trying to learn and apply the profession’s
standards. In contrast to what one might think when one hears the term “learning model”,
I will not model agents as arriving with diﬀerent beliefs and examine whether there is
convergence to a common belief. Instead, the model will be constructed so that agents will
have common beliefs at every point in time and I will focus on whether agents’ attempts
to learn the prevailing norm lead to a shift in norms.8
The model involves a discrete set of time periods t = 0,1,2,.... At the start of period
t all economists believe that that the social norm is (αt,zt). They then write a paper and
try to publish it as in the static game of Section 2 and serve as a referee. The data they
receive via referee reports and editorial decisions will suggest to them that the social norm
8This focus is not intended to suggest that whether a community will reach a common norm and the
eﬀects of belief or preference heterogeneity on the evolution of social norms are not interesting. Instead, as
in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), the common beliefs learning model is motivated solely by the desire for a
tractable model that highlights an important eﬀect.







ˆ αt − αt
ˆ zt − zt
!
for some constant k > 0. To complete the speciﬁcation I must describe what data economists
gather and how they draw the inferences (ˆ αt, ˆ zt) from the data.
What data do economists get? I assume that economists get two types of data points.
First, when an author submits a paper of quality at least q I assume that the referee reports
he or she receives give him or her a data point of the form (q,r(q)).9 These datapoints
should all lie on the line αtq + (1 − αt)r(q) = zt. I will allow, however, for the possibility
that economists are subject to an overconﬁdence bias when judging the quality of their
own work. In particular, I’ll assume that they overestimate the r-quality of their initial
submission and this leads them to believe that they have been required to achieve an r-
quality that is  higher than what they have actually been required to achieve.10 In this
case, the (q,r(q)) datapoints actually lie on the line αtq + (1 − αt)r(q) = zt + (1 − αt).
Second, whenever an economist referees a paper that is of suﬃciently high quality to be
resubmitted he or she gets a data point of the form (q,r,Accept/Reject).1112 Economists
expect to see all papers lying above the line αtq + (1 − αt)r = zt being accepted and all
papers lying below this line being rejected.
If economists each saw a ﬁnite number of data points, then their analyses would lead
to a divergence in the second period beliefs even if they entered the model with common
beliefs. To keep the model tractable I avoid this by invoking word-of-mouth communication.
9Note that in a slight departure from the static model I’ve assumed that journals do not provide the
author with a list of revisions suﬃcient to make the paper publishable if the paper’s q-quality is so low
as to make it inconceivable that a revision will be publishable. I believe that this is a good description
of journal practices. I did not try to incorporate such behavior by referees in the static model, however,
because it seemed a needless complication and because it creates a possibility for another type of equilibrium
multiplicity that I did not feel was important: authors won’t save time for revisions if referees won’t ask for
large revisions because they don’t think they’re feasible.
10Given that the acceptance fronteir is downward sloping in q-r space this assumption is almost equivalent
to assuming that authors believe their papers to be of slightly higher q-quality than they actually are, or
to assuming that have biased views of both the q- and r-quality of their work. I’ve chosen the formulation
above because it makes some results a little cleaner (especially those about small α behavior.)
11Another important data source for real world economists is reading journals. Given the word-of-mouth
assumption below, this would just provide redundant observations on all of the acceptances. For this reason,
nothing would be changed if I included this data source in the model.
12An ambiguity in the model is what happens if the assumed standards is so excessively high that fewer
than τ papers are resubmitted. In the simulations in the next section I assume that in this case editors
accept some papers that are not resubmitted and that these acceptances are observed by the referees.
17I assume that each economist talks to every other economist in each period and thereby
sees all of the data points that were generated in that period. While this makes each
author’s own experiences a measure zero subset of his or her dataset, I do not want to lose
the possibility of inferences being aﬀected by the authors’ misperceptions of the quality of
their own work. I thus assume that the (q,r(q)) observations economists receive by hearing
others talk about the referee reports they received are contaminated by the author’s bias
(and that the listeners do not realize this).
What do economists do with the data they obtain each period? Fitting the (α,z) model
involves estimating the slope and intercept of a line that ﬁts the (q,r(q)) data and divides
the acceptance and rejection regions. Typically, no line will do both jobs perfectly. I assume
that this does not cause economists to lose faith in their model of the world and that they
go ahead and try to ﬁt the data as well as possible with the (α,z) model.13
Formally, I assume that economists’ period t analyses take the form
(ˆ αt, ˆ zt) = argmin
α,z L(α,z;µ1,µ2),
where L(α,z) is a loss function that describes how poorly the the data (a measure µ1
describing the (q,r(q)) points and a measure µ2 describing the (q,r,Accept/Reject) points)
ﬁt the hypothesis that all referees and the journal editor are applying the (α,z) social norm.
Speciﬁcally, I assume that









is a standard mean squared deviation measure of the distance (in the r-dimension) between


















13Formally, economists are estimating a misspeciﬁed model. A justiﬁcation for not worrying about
economists noticing the misspeciﬁcation is that in a more realistic model economists would only receive
a ﬁnite number of datapoints and there would be a random component to each observation, so the form
of the misspeciﬁcation would not be so apparent. The idea that economists struggle to reconcile hard-to-
reconcile observations while maintaining biased self images does not seem unrealistic to me.
18where RUA is the set of (q,r) values for which papers were “unexpectedly accepted” despite
failing to meet the (α,z) standard and RUR is the set of “unexpectedly rejected” papers
that met the (α,z) standard but were rejected. L2 can be thought of as the product of the
fraction of accept/reject decisions that are inconsistent with the (α,z) model and the aver-
age degree of error (in the r-dimension) that appears to be embodied in the “unexpected”
decisions.
Obviously other loss functions would be reasonable. The most natural would probably
be the negative of the log likelihood of the data under a hypothesis involving referees and
the editor trying to apply the (α,z) norm but making idiosyncratic errors in judging the
quality of each paper. Analyzing such a speciﬁcation would require examinining integrals of
CDF’s and PDF’s, however, and I felt that the speciﬁcation above was the best compromise
in terms of reﬂecting a similar goodness-of-ﬁt notion and being tractable.
6 Analysis of the dynamic model with no overconﬁdence bias
( = 0)
In this section I discuss the behavior of the dynamic model when economists do not have
an inﬂated view of the quality of their own work. The main observations are that consis-
tent social norms are steady states of the model and that when referees are too demanding
economists infer both that their standards were too high and that q-quality must be rela-
tively less important than they had thought.
6.1 Steady states
When there is no overconﬁdence bias it is easy to see that any consistent social norm of
the static model is a steady state of the dynamic learning model.
Proposition 5 Suppose  = 0 in the dynamic model and (α0,z0) is a consistent social
norm. Then, (αt,zt) = (α0,z0) for all t.
Proof
All points (q,r(q)) in the data obtained from referees’ reports lie exactly on the line
α0q+(1−α0)r(q) = z0. The editor’s decisions are also consistent with imposing the (α0,z0)
19standard, i.e. all rejected papers have α0q+(1−α0)r−z0 ≤ 0 and all accepted papers have
α0q + (1 − α0)r − z0 ≥ 0. Hence, both L1 and L2 are zero for (α,z) = (α0,z0). Because
the q-distribution is nonatomic on a continuous support, L1 is strictly positive (and L2 is
always nonnegative) for any other (α,z). The unique minimum of the loss function is thus
(ˆ α0, ˆ z0) = (α0,z0).
QED.
6.2 Disequilibrium dynamics
In this section I discuss the disequlibrium behavior of the dynamic model. The results
in this section (and in the remainder of the paper) will concern the uniform technology
for q-production, q ∼ U[0,tq]. The whole of what I want to say in this section can be
summarized concisely by saying that the dynamic evolution of economists’ beliefs about
the social norm (α,z) outside of equilibrium follows the pattern illustrated in Figure 5.
The ﬁgure was constructed by solving the model numerically for various initial beliefs
under the assumption that q ∼ U[0,tq], τ = 0.3, σ = 0.2 and h(t) =
√
t − t/2. The solid
line in the ﬁgure is the locus of consistent social norms (α,z∗(α)). The vectors in the ﬁgure
are proportional to the change in beliefs (αt+1−αt,zt+1−zt) that occurs for various initial
beliefs.14 To help organize the dynamics I have also placed a vertical dashed line in the
ﬁgure at α = 0.3363. This is where the equilibrium shifts from the somewhat low α form
to the typical form.
The locus of consistent social norms and the dashed line divide (α,z) space into four
regions. In three of the four regions the learing process is mostly just a straightforward
adjustment of the overall quality threshold: when referees try to impose a standard that
would not allow the editor to ﬁll the journal they infer from the unexpected acceptances
that they must reduce z; when referees are too soft and the editor has to turn down some
papers they recommend they learn to choose a higher z.15
14The speed with which beliefs change in the model is determined by an arbitrary scaling parameter k.
The ﬁgure uses k = 0.6. Note that unlike all other graphs in this paper the x and y axes in this ﬁgure do
not have the same scale. The y-axis has been magniﬁed by a factor of 1.5. These choices reﬂect an attempt
to maximize the visibility of the directions and minimize clutter.
15The dynamics in the z < z
∗(α) and α large region ﬁt this description only if α is not too large. I discuss
what happens in the “high α” case at the end of this section.
























































































































































































































Figure 5: The disequilibrium evolution of social norms when  = 0.
What is most important to my main argument is what happens in the fourth region
— the upper right part of Figure 5. Suppose that the (αt,zt) standard is unreasonably
high, i.e. z > z∗(α). Suppose also that the distribution of resubmitted papers has the
“typical” form. Economists will then (correctly) perceive that referees are asking them to
meet a very high standard and that some papers that they thought were submarginal are
being accepted. The conﬂict in this data leads economists to do two things: to believe that
quality standards are less demanding than they had thought; and to believe that r-quality
is relatively more important than than they had thought.
To illustrate why economists make this inference, Figure 6 contains an enlarged view
of the data economists get in one such case.16 The bold line represents the (q,r(q)) dat-
apoints they get from referee reports. The outlined area is the support of the (uniform)
quality distribution. All papers above and to the right of the bold line are accepted. The
journal editor also accepts papers in the shaded region (to the surprise of the referees).
Lower quality papers are rejected. The lines below the q-axis and to the left of the r-axis
16The ﬁgure graphs the quality distribution and the best ﬁt (ˆ α, ˆ z) when initial beliefs are that α = 0.5
and z = 0.53417 with q ∼ U[0,tq], h(t) =
√
t − t/2, σ = 0.2 and τ = 0.3.
21illustrate the support of the q and r distributions among resubmitted papers. I have used
bold lines to show the support of the quality distribution for the unexpectedly accepted
papers. These papers are at the low end of the q distribution and at the high end of the r
distribution. Economists’ rationalize these acceptances in part by concluding that r must
be more important than they had thought. The dashed line graphs the social norm (ˆ α, ˆ z)
that best ﬁts the data. The ﬂatter line accounts for many unexpected acceptances and
gives a good ﬁt to the high q part of the (q,r(q)) data.
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Figure 6: Economists’ inferences when standards are too high: the “typical” case
Figure 7 contains a similar diagram illustrating economists inferences when referees’
beliefs (αt,zt) are unreasonably tough and αt is suﬃcently low so that the distribution of
resubmitted papers has the “low α” form — all papers are resubmitted and all authors
devote the same maximum eﬀort to their revisions. Here, the “unexpectedly accepted”
papers are uniformly distributed in the q dimension, and the dotted line illustrates that the
best ﬁt is obtained by slightly lowering z while leaving the slope of the line unchanged.
Even with the simple loss function I’ve chosen, getting analytic expressions for the
optimal inference given an inconsistent (αt,zt) is diﬃcult. Proposition 6 is a characteri-
zation of the dynamics that brings out the main observations I’ve mentioned above. The
proposition characterizes the dynamics for initial beliefs that are close to being consistent,
i.e. for zt close to z∗(αt). Parts (a) and (b) note that in the low α and somewhat low
22-
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Figure 7: Inferences when standards are too high: the “low α” case.
α cases economists do not adjust their estimate of α (at least approximately) and adjust
their estimate of z toward z∗(αt). Part (c) notes that when referees’ beliefs correspond to
a standard that is too low the dynamics are similar in the “typical” case: the dynamics are
approximately vertical when the social norm is approximately consistent. Part (d) relates
to my main observation. It notes that when zt is slightly larger than z∗(αt) the dynamics
involve both a reduction in α and a reduction in the overall quality standard (after ac-
counting for the change that is induced mechanically by the change in α). The shifts in the
two parameters are comparable in magnitude. The proof of the proposition is contained in
Appendix A.
Proposition 6 Consider the dynamic model described above with F(q|tq) ∼ U[0,tq]. Let
tq(α,z) be economists’ optimal time allocation when they believe that the social norm is
(α,z). Write b(z) ≈ a(z − z∗(α)) as shorthand for limz→z∗(α)
b(z)
z−z∗(α) = a.
(a) Suppose that for a given αt ∈ (0,1) the unique equilibrium for the social norm (αt,z∗(αt))
has the low α form. Then there exists a constant a > 0 such that for zt in a neighborhood
of z∗(αt) the dynamics have
αt+1 − αt = 0
zt+1 − zt = a(z∗(αt) − zt)
23(b) Suppose that for a given αt ∈ (0,1) the unique equilibrium for the social norm (αt,z∗(αt))
has the somewhat low α form and that ∂2G
∂t2 is strictly positive at t = tq(αt,z∗(αt)). Then
there exists a constant a > 0 such that for zt close to z∗(αt) the dynamics have
αt+1 − αt ≈ 0
zt+1 − zt ≈ a(z∗(αt) − zt)
For zt slightly larger than z∗(αt) the dynamics have αt+1 − αt = 0.
(c) Suppose that for a given αt ∈ (0,1) the unique equilibrium for the social norm (αt,z∗(αt))
has the “typical” form and zt < z∗(αt). Then there exists a constant a > 0 such that for zt
close to z∗(αt) the dynamics have
αt+1 − αt ≈ 0
zt+1 − zt ≈ a(z∗(αt) − zt),
(d) Suppose that for a given αt ∈ (0,1) the unique equilibrium for the social norm (αt,z∗(αt))
has the “typical” form and zt > z∗(αt). Let Mq = (q(αt,zt) + tq(αt,zt))/2 and Mr =
zt−αtMq
1−αt . Then there exist constants a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 such that for zt close to z∗(αt) the
dynamics have
αt+1 − αt ≈ −a1(zt − z∗(αt))
zt+1 − zt ≈ a2(z∗(αt) − zt) + (αt+1 − αt)(Mq − Mr)
The one notable feature of the Figure 5 that I have left out of the discussion so far
is what happens when z < z∗(α) and α is suﬃciently high so that the equilibrium has
the high α form It is apparent from the ﬁgure that in this case economists conclude that
q is relatively more important than they had thought. The argument is similar to the
argument for why economists conclude that r is more important than they had thought
when standard are too high in a typical equilibrium. The unexpectedly rejected papers
are relatively low q papers and hence a steeper line allows referees to account for many of
the unexpected rejections while maintaining a good ﬁt to the r(q) data for high q papers.
I have not discussed this case in more detail because in a couple of ways the argument
here seems less plausible. First, it involves economists mistakenly not achieving levels of
24r-quality that they could have achieved. Second, the eﬀect derives from economists trying
to ﬁt datapoints with r(q) negative.
7 The overconﬁdence bias and gradual evolution
In this section I show that adding a slight overconﬁdence bias produces a model in which
social norms can slowly and steadily evolve over a long period to place ever more emphasis
on r-quality.
7.1 -perturbations of dynamics with a continuum of steady-states
Before discussing the model, it is instructive to discuss its stucture in more generality. The







ˆ αt − αt
ˆ zt − zt
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where (ˆ α, ˆ z) = argminα,z L(α,z;αt,zt).17 A social norm (αt,zt) is a steady-state only if it







This is a system of two equations in two unknowns. Ordinarily, one would expect such a
system to have one solution (or zero or a few). The fact that the dynamic model of the
previous section has a continuum of equilibria indicates that it is somewhat special.
What happens if we take a dynamic model with a continuum of equilibria and perturb
it slightly? The answer of course depends on how the system is pertubed. To take a simple
example, consider a dynamic of the form above with the loss function
L(α,z;αt,zt) = (α − αt)2 + (z − zt)2 + (z − α)2.
This model has every point on the line zt = αt as a steady state. One thing that can
happen with an -perturbation is an -order shift in the set of steady states. For example,
17While I earlier deﬁned L as depending on the measures µ1 and µ2 describing the two types of data, µ1
and µ2 are themselves functions of αt and zt. I use αt and zt as arguments of L in this section to clarify
the nature of the dynamic.
25if we perturb the loss function above to
L(α,z;αt,zt,) = (α − αt)2 + (z − zt)2 + (z − (α + ))2,
the system has a continuum of steady states given by zt = αt + .
With a generic perturbation, however, the continuum of steady states will disappear.
For example, if we instead perturb the system to
L(α,z;αt,zt,) = (α − αt)2 + (z − zt)2 + (z − α)2 + z2,
the only remaining steady-state is αt = zt = 0. What happens to the former equilibria? In
this example, the  perturbed dynamics are
ˆ α − αt =
1 + 
3 + 2




ˆ z − zt =
1 + 
3 + 2




The ﬁrst terms on the right hand sides of these equations tell us that from any initial
condition the dynamics lead quickly to a neighborhood of the nearly stable locus zt = αt.
The system then evolves at an  rate in a neighborhood of this locus toward the steady
state. If the initial condition is very from the steady state a long gradual evolution would
be observed.
Obviously, the most natural way to account for a long gradual trend in an economic
variable will usually be to view the trend as reﬂecting a continuous shift in the equilibrium
of a model due to a trending exogenous variable. The most general idea the dynamic model
is intended to convey is that the disequilibrium dynamics in perturbations of models with a
continuum of equilibria may provide an alternate method for explaining some such trends.
7.2 Social norms for academic publishing
My main observation about the model with no overconﬁdence bias was that if referees try to
hold authors to an unreasonably high standard, then social norms will evolve to place more
weight on r-quality. This disequilibrium shift is not an appealing candidate for explaining
observed shifts in academic standards for two reasons. First, such an explanation would
be incomplete in that we have no reason to expect initial beliefs to be too demanding as
26opposed to too undemanding. Second, and more importantly, the model does not ﬁt a long
gradual trend. Instead, social norms in such a model move very quickly to a neighborhood
of the equilibrium set and then converge slowly without much further movement along the
equilibrium set.
The dynamics with an  overconﬁdence bias are qualitatively diﬀerent. When beliefs
are far from the equilibrium set, the -perturbation has little impact — we again see rapid
convergence to a neighborhood of the set of equilibria of the unperturbed model. The over-
conﬁdence then becomes important. In the typical case it destabilizes the former equilibria.
If economists’ initial beliefs correspond to a consistent social norm, then their mispercep-
tions of the referee reports they receive will lead them to conclude that overall quality
standards must be higher than they had thought (i.e. ˆ z −zt > 0.) For this reason, referees
will perpetually try to hold authors to a standard that is slightly higher than is feasible. The
-overconﬁdence does not aﬀect the argument that economists will conclude that r-quality
is more important than they had thought whenever standards are higher than is feasible.
Hence, when the equilibrium has the typical form we will observe a gradual evolution of
social norms through the near equilibrium set toward lower α values.
Must we look forward to a world with no q-quality whatsoever? In my model at least,
the answer is no. In the neighborhood of a consistent social norm the eﬀect of a small
overconﬁdence bias is to make economists think that z must be slightly higher than they
had thought. In the low α and somewhat low α cases, when the standard is slightly too high
economists infer that z must be slightly lower than they had thought. For any such α, the
two eﬀects turn out to exactly oﬀset for some z slightly greater than z∗(α). The -perturbed
model has a continuum of steady-states lying just above the low α and somewhat low α
portions of the set of steady states of the unperturbed model. The model thus predicts that
the evolution of social norms will come to a halt as soon as r is suﬃciently important so
that no paper’s idea is good enough to let its author be sure that he or she will eventually
be able to get an acceptance.
Figure 8 illustrates the dynamics of the system with a small overconﬁdence bias. The
ﬁgure was generated by solving the model numerically for various initial beliefs under the
assumption that q ∼ U[0,tq], τ = 0.3, σ = 0.2, h(t) =
√
t − t/2 and  = 0.01. The thick
27solid curve on the left side of the ﬁgure is the locus of steady states (α,z(α)). On the right
side of the ﬁgure I’ve graphed eight curves illustrating the evolution of social norms from
eight initial conditions. While the curves appear to join together well before they reach
the left endpoint, they actually remain separate over the whole range and in an extremely
magniﬁed ﬁgure what now appears to be one central curve would be revealed to be a set
of nearly parallel curves. From initial conditions with z large the system initially evolves
down and to the left toward the set of nearly stable norms and then moves along this set
until the somewhat low α region is reached. From initial conditions with z small there is
an initial evolution up toward the nearly stable set, and then again a movement to the left
along the nearly stable set.
The arrows on the curves give a feeling for the speed of movement. The arrows mark
the beliefs that prevail after one period of evolution and then after every ten additional
periods.18 The fact that the arrows are initially far apart on each curve reﬂects that the
initial movement toward the nearly stable set is rapid — from most starting points the
curves get suﬃciently close to the nearly stable set to be indistinguishable to the naked
eye within ten or twenty periods. The fact that arrows then become closely and regularly
spaced as norms evolve along the nearly stable set reﬂects that this evolution is slow and
steady. Here, the evolution from a near equilibrium with α = 0.8 to a near equilibrium
with α = 0.4 takes about two hundred periods.
Proposition 7 provides a formal description of some properties of the system. Part
(a) notes that the model has a continuum of equilibria covering roughly the low α and
somewhat low α ranges. Part (b) notes that when α is such that the equilibrium has the
typical form there is no steady state: at (α,z∗(α)) the data is better ﬁt by increasing z;
when z is slightly higher than z∗(α) the ﬁt is improved by reducing α.
Proposition 7 Consider the dynamic model described above with F(q|tq) ∼ U[0,tq]. Let
tq(α,z) be economists’ optimal time allocation when they believe that the social norm is
(α,z).
(a) Suppose that for a given α ∈ (0,1) the unique equilibrium for the social norm (α,z∗(α))
with  = 0 has the low α or somewhat low α form. Suppose that ∂2G
∂t2 is strictly positive
18In constructing the ﬁgure I took k = 0.5
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Figure 8: The disequilibrium evolution of social norms when  > 0.
at t = tq(α,z∗(α)). Then for  suﬃciently small there exists a value of z, z(α) such that
(α,z(α)) is a steady state of the model with -overconﬁdence
Further, there exists a positive constant a such that, z(α)−z∗(α) ≈ a when  is small. In
the low α case z(α) is exactly equal to z∗(α) + 2(1 − α)σ when  is suﬃciently small.
(b) Suppose that for a given α ∈ (0,1) the unique equilibrium for the social norm
(α,z∗(α)) with  = 0 has the typical form. When  > 0 we have ∂L
∂z (α,z∗(α);α,z∗(α)) < 0.
For  suﬃciently small there exists a z > z∗(α) for which the distribution of paper qualities
and expectedly and unexpectedly accepted papers has the typical form pictured in Figure 6
and the loss function has ∂L
∂z (α,z;α,z) = 0. For any such z, ∂L
∂α(α,z;α,z) < 0. Hence, the
system does not have a steady state where the distribution of paper qualities has the typical
form.
Let z(α) be the smallest value of z such that ∂L
∂z (α,z;α,z) = 0. Then there exist positive
constants a and b such that z(α) − z∗(α) ≈ a and ∂L
∂α(α,z(α);α,z(α)) ≈ −b for small
.
For those who do not believe that academics suﬀer from overconﬁdence bias (and those
29who are wondering if observed changes in standards should be taken as providing evidence
of such a bias), I would like to note that a gradual evolution toward lower α norms can
be generated by many small modiﬁcations to the basic dynamic model. Essentially, any
perturbation that makes referees perpetually try to hold authors to a slightly infeasibly high
standard will do the same thing. One example would be an assumption that referees try
to make up more extensive lists of revisions than is standard to impress editors with their
thoroughness. Another would be an assumption that referees are competitive (or spiteful)
and try to hold back others in their ﬁeld by imposing standards that are slightly higher
than the norm (perhaps because making requests that are even more demanding would
expose their spite).
In a standard one-dimensional model where the optimal level of revisions is determined
by a cost of revisions or in a one-dimensional learning model where referees are learn z by
observing referees’ reports and editors’ decisions, an -perturbation like these just produces
a model in which the original equilibrium (or steady-state) is shifted by . In the two-
dimensional learning model, however,  changes can greatly change the equilibrium set and
create steady long-term disequilibrium evolution.
8 Conclusion
I have proposed that it is helpful to think about observed changes in the economics pub-
lishing process with a two-dimensional q-r model of quality. The idea behind the dynamic
model is that social norms for weighing diﬀerent aspects of quality may shift as economists
struggle to reconcile the high standards being applied to them with the mediocrity they
see in journals. The model predicts a long gradual shift in standards. Academics react
by spending less and less time developing new insights and more and more time polishing
papers.
Among the many possible extensions to the model, I view the incorporation of random-
ness in the assessment of quality and in economists’ data samples as the most intriguing.
Referees who receive signals suggesting that standards are higher than they are may con-
clude that r-quality is more important than they thought, while referees who receive signals
suggesting that standards are lower than they are will not draw the opposite conclusion.
30Even without an overconﬁdence bias we may see increasing emphasis placed on r-quality.
Sobel’s (1998) work suggests that randomness in assessments due to heterogeneity in tastes
may have more subtle eﬀects.
What are the welfare eﬀects of changes in publication standards? There are no answers
within my model, because individual preferences over q and r do not appear. If preferences
are time invariant, then welfare changes as standards evolve. Whether changes are welfare
increasing or welfare decreasing depends on how the prevailing social norm diﬀers from the
optimum given authors’ and readers’ preferences.
The changes of the last few decades have had a substantial impact on economists. Many
young economists report spending as much time revising old papers as working on new ones.
Guiding larger and more frequent revisions is an additional burden on referees and editors.
If the changes that have occurred were accidental and many other social norms are really
possible, then a discussion in the profession of what standards we would like to have would
be valuable.
While I have emphasized the model of learning with overconﬁdence, other explanations
for the observed changes are possible. Indeed, one of the main motivations for the static
model is to clarify how the growth of the economics profession, changes in the set of ideas
waiting to be discovered and other factors might alter the publication process. Ultimately,
which of the potential explanations are most important is an empirical question. I attempt
to begin this sorting out in Ellison (2000).
How else might one examine the evolutionary model empirically? With ideal data
one could directly examine referees’ demands and see how they are aﬀected by referees’
experiences as authors. A general premise of the model that may be more easily examined
is that learning occurs within communities of referees. A good empirical test would be
to observe whether a random shock to a particular ﬁeld at a particular journal, e.g. the
appointment of a new editor who likes revisions, aﬀects how papers in the ﬁeld are treated at
other journals. Another feature that distinguishes the evolutionary model from equilibrium
models is that transitory shocks have permanent eﬀects. For example, even after a revision-
loving editor is replaced, the fact that referees learned a high revision norm will ensure that
publication remains slow for years to come.
31In addition to trying to change how people think about academic publishing, I have
tried to make the general point that a long run trend can be a disequilibrium phenomenon.
Comparative statics of equilibria will remain the standard for explaining trends, but I hope
that models like that I’ve developed here will ﬁnd other applications.
32Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 6







− h(1 − tq)

.
This function has ∂G
∂tq = − αt
2σ(1−αt) + h0(1 − tq), which is independent of z. It also has
∂2G
∂t2
q = −h00(1 − tq) > 0, and hence in a neighborhood of z∗(αt), tq(αt,zt) is independent of
zt. The continuity of the thresholds implies that the ordering q < 0 < m(tq) < q holds for
all zt in a neighborhood of z∗(αt).
Write ra(q;αt,zt) for the level of r-quality that is actually necessary for an editor to
accept a paper of q-quality q when the population believes the standard is (αt,zt). Because
tq(αt,zt) is locally independent of zt and all authors revise to the greatest extent possible,
ra(q;αt,zt) = r(q;αt,z∗(αt)) for zt near z∗(αt). The situation is thus like that pictured
in Figure 7. When zt < z∗(αt) the situation is similar, but involving a parallelogram of
unexpectedly rejected papers lying just above the (q,r(q)) line.
To describe economists’ inferences, I’ll make a change of variables and analyze the
minimization of the loss function over m and w where m = −α
1−α is the slope of the line
and w =
z−αMq
1−α is the level of r quality required of a paper with the mean q-quality,
Mq ≡ (tq(αt,zt) + max(0,q(αt,zt)))/2. I’ll carry out the calculations for zt > z∗(αt). The
calculations in the opposite case are identical but with some signs reversed.
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tq(αt,zt)2(m − mt)2 + (w − wt)2
By making a few comparisons it is easy to see that the minimum of L1 +L2 can not be
achieved for w > wt, or for w < ra(Mq,αt,zt), or with a slope m for which w + m(−Mq)
is outside the interval [ra(0;αt,zt),r(0;αt,zt)]. (For example, to show the second note that
for any such w, L(m,w) > L(mt,ra(Mq,αt,zt)) because L1 is smaller at (mt,ra(Mq,αt,zt))
and L2 has its global minimum there.) In the range containing any potential minumum,













19To make the formulas more readable I’ll often omit the µ1 and µ2 arguments of L1 and L2. µ1 and µ2
are determined by αt and zt, so I’ll also sometimes substitute αt and zt (or mt and wt) as arguments. I will






















The minimum clearly involves ˆ m = mt. This gives the ﬁrst part of the conclusion: ˆ α = αt.
The minimizing value for w is ˆ w =
2wt+(1/σ)ra(Mq;αt,zt)
2+1/σ . Recall that ra is independent of














Substituting this into the expression for ˆ w gives
ˆ w − wt =
1
(2σ + 1)(1 − αt)
(z∗(αt) − zt).
Using the identities αt = ˆ α and zt = αtMq + (1 − αt)wt allows us to conclude as desired
that
zt+1 − zt = k(ˆ αMq + (1 − ˆ α) ˆ w − zt) = k(αtMq + (1 − αt) ˆ w − αtMq + (1 − αt)wt)




(b) The proof for the somewhat low α case is very similar. One diﬀerence is that the form
of G is diﬀerent. This makes it possible that the second derivative of G will not be strictly
positive at tq(αt,z∗(αt)), in which case tq(αt,zt) might not be diﬀerentiable at zt = z∗(αt).
This would cause many complications. To avoid them, I’ve just assumed in the proposition
that ∂2G
∂t2
q (αt,tq(αt,z∗(αt))) > 0. This ensures that tq(αt,z) is diﬀerentiable in z at z∗(αt).
The analysis of the zt > z∗(αt) case then proceeds exactly as above to show that
ˆ α − αt = 0




Write τa(zt) = 1−G(zt;tq(αt,zt)) for the fraction of papers achieving the zt standard given
the inital beliefs. By the envelope theorem we know that in a neighborhood of z∗(αt),








34The mass of extra papers the editor accepts when he lowers the standard from z∗(αt) to
z∗(αt) − dz is
tq−q
tq(1−αt)σdz. Hence, in a neighborhood of z∗(αt) we have
ra(Mq;αt,zt) − wt =
(1 − αt)σtq







zt+1 − zt ≈ a(z∗(αt) − zt),
for a = k
2σ+1 as desired.
The analysis of the zt < z∗(αt) case adds another slight complication — the formula
for L2 is slightly diﬀerent because there are no papers in the triangle bounded by (q,h(1−
tq)+σ), (q,ra(q,αt,zt)), and (q +(1−αt)(ra(q,αt,zt)−r(q,αt,zt))/αt,h(1−tq)+σ) that













I(r > r(q;m,w))(r − r(q;m,w))dqdr,
where T is the triangle bounded by the three points above and I is the indicator function.
To show that αt+1 −αt ≈ 0 it suﬃces to show that for any c > 0 there exists a δ such that
|ˆ m−mt| < c(z∗(αt)−zt) whenever zt ∈ (z∗(αt)−δ,z∗(αt)). To see this note that for all zt


























I(r > r(q;m,w))(r − r(q;m,w))|,
where A(T) is the area of the triangle T. The area of the triangle is 1−αt
2αt (ra(q;αt,zt) −
r(q;αt,zt))2. The eﬀect of a dm change in m on r(q;m,w) is q−Mq, which is largest when










The (ra(q;αt,zt)−r(q;αt,zt))2 term is a second order eﬀect in z∗(αt)−zt. Hence, ∂L
∂m(m,w) <
0 for all m < mt−c(z∗(αt)−zt) when zt suﬃciently close to z∗(αt). Combining this with a
similar calculation of the derivative for m > mt + c(z∗(αt) − zt) allows us to conclude that
ˆ m ∈ (mt − c(z∗(αt) − zt),mt + c(z∗(αt) − zt)) as desired.
A similar calculation shows that the result on zt+1 −zt is also unaﬀected by the second
order change in the loss function.
35(c) When the equilibrium has the typical form G(z;tq) is given by
G(z;tq) =
z − (1 − αt)(h(1 − tq) + σ/2)
αttq
.
An explicit calculation of the ﬁrst two derivatives of this function shows that ∂2G
∂t2
q (z;tq) > 0
in a neighborhood of (z∗(αt),tq(αt,z∗(αt))). This again implies that
∂tq
∂z (αt,z∗(αt)) exists
and that the distribution of paper qualities has the typical form for zt in some neighborhood
of z∗(αt).
The (q,r(q)) line and the set of unexpectedly rejected papers have exactly the same
form here as in zt < z∗(αt) case of part (b) of the proposition. The result is thus identical
to the result for that case.
(d) As above tq is diﬀerentiable in z at z∗(αt). The distribution of paper qualities and out-
comes has the typical form pictured in Figure 6 for all zt in some neighborhood (z∗(αt),z∗(αt)+
δ).
Write wa for ra(Mq;αt,zt). I ﬁrst note that a number of simple comparisons imply
that economists must infer that standards are lower and q is less important than they had
thought. Speciﬁcally, we must have ˆ m > mt and ˆ w ∈ (wa,wt). To see this, note ﬁrst that
the line given by (ˆ m, ˆ w) can not be entirely above the (mt,wt) line over the whole range
[q(αt,zt),tq(αt,zt)] of q-qualities of resubmitted papers. From any such estimate both L1
and L2 are decreased by moving the line down until there is an intersection. Next, note
that it is also impossible for the minimum to have ˆ w > wt with the (ˆ m, ˆ w) line intersecting
the (mt,wt) line at q ∈ [q,tq]. In this case, L1 and L2 are both reduced by rotating the
ﬁtted line about the point were it intersects the line r = ra(q;mt,wt) in the direction that
reduces ˆ w. The estimates also can not have ˆ w < wa. In this case increasing ˆ w to wa
and setting ˆ m = mt reduces L1 and makes L2 equal to its global minimum. This gives
ˆ w ∈ (ra(Mq;αt,zt),wt). It is then easy to see that ˆ m ≥ mt. Otherwise, slightly reducing ˆ m
would reduce L1 and also reduce L2. (The latter is because the gain from to improving the
ﬁt in (q,min(q,Mq)) is greater than the loss from worsening the ﬁt in the (possibly empty)
interval [Mq,q].) Finally, all of the extreme values (ˆ m = mt, ˆ w = wt and ˆ w = wa) can be
ruled out by looking at derivatives of the loss function.
To obtain the proposition’s further conclusion that the changes in m and w are both
ﬁrst order in zt − z∗(αt) I examine the ﬁrst order conditions of the loss function. Even
after the discussion above there remain a few possibilities for exactly where the best ﬁt line
may intersect the other lines in the ﬁgure: it may be above or below ra(q;αt,zt) at the left
edge and may be above or below r(tq;αt,zt) at the right edge. The ﬁrst order conditions
are slightly diﬀerent in the four cases. I will work out the equations for the simplest case:
assuming that the best ﬁt line is strictly between ra(q;αt,zt) and r(q;αt,zt) throughout
the interval [q,tq].
In this case, the loss function is very similar to the loss function in the cases above.
The only diﬀerences are that the set of unexpectedly accepted papers does not have papers
with q-qualities above q and is also missing a second-order triangle in (q,r)-space below
(q,r(q;αt,zt)). As above, the second-order triangle can be ignored. The estimates have
the same asymptotics as those obtained by minimizing loss functions given by integrals
identical to those in part (a) but with diﬀerent lower and upper bounds. Speciﬁcally we






















(Note that I’ve omitted the arguments (αt,zt) arguments of tq, q and q to improve read-
ability.) The ﬁrst order conditions for this minimization are of the form
c1(ˆ m − mt) − c2( ˆ w − wa) = 0
−c2(ˆ m − mt) + c3( ˆ w − w0) = 0,
where w0 =
2σ(tq−q)wt+(q−q)wa
2σ(tq−q)+(q−q) is a weighted average of wt and wa and c1, c2 and c3 are
positive constants: c1 = 1







4(q − q)(tq − q); c2 =
(q−q)(tq−q)
2σ(tq−q) ; and
c3 = 2 +
q−q
σ(tq−q). Adding c2/c3 times the second equation to the ﬁrst gives





2σ(tq − q) + (q − q)
(wt − wa).
We know that the true minimum has ˆ m > mt and that wt > wa, so the ﬁrst order conditions
of this case can only give the true minimum if the constant in this expression is positive.
The equations also give








From the discussion above this can be the true minumum only if the leading constant is
negative.
The fact that wt −wa ≈ (zt −z∗(αt))/(1−αt) implies that ˆ m−mt and ˆ w −wt are ﬁrst
order in zt − z∗(αt). The longer expression for zt+1 − zt follows from the calculation
ˆ z − zt = ˆ αMq + (1 − ˆ α) ˆ w − (αtMq + (1 − αt)wt)
= (1 − αt)( ˆ w − wt) + Mq(ˆ α − αt) − ˆ w(ˆ α − αt)
= (1 − αt)( ˆ w − wt) + (Mq − Mr)(ˆ α − αt) + (Mr − ˆ w)(ˆ α − αt)
The last term in this expression is second order in zt − z∗(αt).
QED.
Proof of Proposition 7
(a) Recall from the proof of Proposition 6 that tq(αt,zt) is diﬀerentiable in z at z∗(αt) and
that the distribution of paper qualities will also have the low α or somewhat low α form
for zt in a neighborhood of z∗(αt). The same computation as in the proof of part (b) of
37Proposition 6 shows that for zt in some neighborhood (z∗(αt),z∗(αt)+δ) the loss function












Diﬀerentiating, (mt,wt) is a steady state if and only if wt − ra(Mq;αt,zt) = 2σ. In the
previous proof we also saw that wt − ra(Mq;αt,zt) ≈ 1
1−αt(zt − z∗(αt)). Hence, for 
suﬃciently small we can ﬁnd a zt > z∗(αt) that satisﬁes the equation for a steady state.
In the somewhat low α case the equations above give z(α) − z∗(α) ≈ 2(1 − α)σ. In
the low α case we saw earlier that the expression wt − ra(Mq;αt,zt) = 1
1−αt(zt − z∗(αt)) is
exact when zt is suﬃciently close to z∗(αt), and hence the expression for z(α) − z∗(α) is
an equality as well.
(b) Again for a given αt the distribution of papers has the typical form if zt is suﬃciently
close to z∗(αt). For wt in a neighborhood of r(Mq;αt,zt) and (m,w) suﬃciently close to
(mt,wt) with m ≤ mt, w ≥ wt the expression for the loss function is again a slight variant























where again I’ve written wa for ra(Mq;αt,zt) to save space. A direct computation shows
that ∂L
∂m(mt,wt;mt,wt) = 0 and ∂L
∂w(mt,wt;mt,wt) < 0 when (mt,wt) corresponds to a
consistent social norm. This is the ﬁrst result mentioned in part (b).
We will ﬁnd ∂L
∂z = 0 with L parameterized by (α,z) if and only if ∂L
∂w = 0 when L is pa-
rameterized by (m,w). A simple calculation of derivatives shows that ∂L
∂w(mt,wt;mt,wt) = 0
if and only if




As above this has a solution zt with zt−z∗(αt) ≈ 2(1−αt)σ
tq−q
q−q . This establishes the next
claim in part (b) and the fact that the smallest solution has z(αt) − z∗(αt) ≈ a for some
a > 0.
If (mt,wt) were a steady state of the dynamics in which the distribution of paper
qualities had the typical form it would have to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition above and the
additional constraint that ∂L
∂m(mt,wt;mt;wt) = 0. We know that ∂L1
∂m (mt,wt;mt;wt) = 0
for any mt and wt. The w FOC can only be satisﬁed for wt > r(Mq;αt,zt). For such values
















The ﬁrst term is the surprise due to the unexpected acceptance of papers with q-qualities
above q, and the second is the suprise due to the unexpected acceptance of papers with




(tq − q)2 − 4(q − Mq)2
8σ(tq − q)
(wt − wa).
The derivative with respect to α is simply this expression divided by (1 − αt)2. This
is negative, which is the second conclusion of part (b). It is also immediate from the
expression that ∂L
∂α(αt,zt;αt,zt) ≈ b.
Looking at the numerator in the equation for ∂L
∂m we can also see that the gain from
reducing α vanishes as we approach the somewhat low α region and q approaches tq (or as
α approaches one and q approaches q.)
QED.
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Eng. - Mech. Journal of Eng. Mechanics and ASCE 15.3 8.5 14.9 19.2
Finance Journal of Finance 13.9 34.8 15.0 30.8
Geography Ann. of the Assoc. of Amer. Geographers 12.7 24.4 37.1 67.1
Geology Geology 4.8 4.0 19.8 25.2
Geology Journal of Geology 17.8 15.3 35.7 50.7
History American Historical Review 22.5 31.0 85.9 62.7
History Journal of American History 22.8 28.4 75.2 65.9
Law Harvard Law Review 59.1 92.4 156.6 47.7
Law Yale Law Journal 56.2 85.4 165.9 59.1
Linguistics Language 18.8 a30.1 30.9 61.2
Mathematics Annals of Mathematics 21.6 35.0 18.0 28.4
Mathematics Inventiones Mathematicae 22.7 34.6 16.1 25.2
Medicine New England Journal of Medicine 4.0 7.2 23.0 24.9
Medicine Journal of the Amer. Medical Assoc. 4.1 6.6 9.5 24.2
Oceanography Limnology and Oceanography 10.2 11.3 26.5 42.3
Paleontology Journal of Paleontology 13.8 12.8 19.2 45.4
Philosophy Philosophy of Science 15.8 20.6 16.0 32.3
Physics Physical Review Letters 3.3 4.0 15.4 20.8
Physics Physical Review B 8.9 8.5 25.4 28.6
Physics Physical Review D 8.9 10.7 22.9 31.5
Political Science American Journal of Political Science 16.9 24.2 27.6 37.2
Political Science American Political Science Review 12.7 a16.1 37.1 51.0
Psychology Psychological Review 21.6 a30.3 51.4 60.0
Psychology Journal of Personality and Social Psych. 8.3 14.4 23.8 59.3
Psychology Developmental Psychology 7.8 11.5 12.6 45.8
Sciences Nature 4.2 5.7 17.8 25.8
Sciences Science 7.7 5.5 23.3 28.5
Sociology American Sociological Review 15.5 17.2 35.8 49.2
Sociology American Journal of Sociology 22.7 39.3 26.2 60.1
Statistics Journal of the Amer. Statistical Assoc. 5.9 11.5 13.5 28.3
Women’s Studies Signs 22.1 31.0 22.5 48.5
Notes: a - Data not adjusted for larger page size.
41Table 2: Duration of the review process at various journals: 1975 and 1999
Mean delay
Field Journal 1975 1999
Mean submission-ﬁnal resubmission time
Biology Cell 1.2 2.2
Computer Science IEEE Transactions on Info. Theory 6.9 13.6
Computer Science Journal of the ACM 10.4 21.0
Economics Econometrica 9.3 26.3
Eng. - Aero. AIAA Journal 5.3 8.7
Eng. - Elec. IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices 4.6 6.0
Eng. - Elec. Proceedings of the IEEE 2.6 6.9
Eng. - Materials Journal of Materials Science 1.5 5.2
Finance Journal of Finance a6.5 18.6
Mathematics Annals of Mathematics 2.0 5.5
Mathematics Inventiones Mathematicae 1.3 10.8
Philosophy Philosophy of Science 0.9 5.8
Physics Physical Review B 0.4 1.3
Political Science American Journal of Political Science 6.0 7.6
Psychology Psychological Review 1.7 18.8
Statistics Annals of Statistics 15.0 18.0
Statistics Journal of the Amer. Statistical Assoc. 10.1 18.6
Stat. - Bio. Biometrika 5.3 15.1
Stat. - Psych. Psychometrika 8.1 16.8
Mean submission-acceptance time
Ecology Ecology 8.9 b9.2
Economics Quarterly Journal of Economics 8.5 13.0
Economics Review of Economic Studies 12.1 28.8
Geology Geology 2.2 4.6
Oceanography Limnology and Oceanography 7.0 c8.8
Mean submission-publication time
Astronomy Astrophysical Journal 7.9 10.7
Chemistry Journal of the Amer. Chemical Society 7.8 6.2
Geology Journal of Geology 12.4 10.6
Linguistics Language 12.8 24.8
Philosophy Philosophy of the Social Sciences 13.8 22.1
Physics Physical Review Letters 2.1 5.8
Psychology Developmental Psychology 9.8 24.1
Sciences Nature 4.3 4.3
Notes: a - Data for 1979. b - Does not include time for post-acceptance revisions (which
occurred for about 40% of papers.) c - Does not include time for post-acceptance revisions
(which occurred for about 90% of papers.)
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